ABSTRACT American politicians and policy makers have blamed China's exchange rate for the large US trade deficits. This paper explains why the USA treats its trade deficits with China as a security issue that have become a source of friction in Sino-US relations. The essay argues that this friction is a useful de flection from the politically difficult policy action needed to remedy the US economy and cannot easily be removed by the Chinese side alone. The structure of global trade and the reality of China's political economy, which forces Chinese leaders to develop policies for a ''harmonious society'' in the face of growing inequality also makes it difficult for China to respond positively to US pressure on the exchange rate.
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Contemporaneously, China has replaced Japan in the minds of many Americans as the country that posed the greatest challenge to America's economic superiority. In this context, US political players have made the value of the yuan a useful strategic scapegoat for the mounting deficits in US trade, and fuel for the notion that China uses such tactics strategically, to impair the US economy.
Many US Congress members of both major parties blame China for the large US trade deficits through what they cast as China's deliberate undervaluation of the Chinese yuan. In 2007, four senators -Max Baucus, Chuck Grassley, Charles Schumer and Lindsey Graham -introduced into the Congress a bill, co-sponsored by the leading contenders for the Democratic nomination for the 2008 presidential election, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, to impose anti-dumping duties against China's imports into the USA and to bring a trade case against China in the WTO (Callan, 2007) . Obama had earlier requested in a letter to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson that the US Treasury reconsider its decision not to classify China as a currency manipulator to protect the interests of American businesses and American workers (Obama, 2007) . After the presidential election, Timothy Geithner, Obama's nominee as Treasury Secretary, labelled China a currency manipulator during his Senate confirmation hearing before he retracted his comments after complaints from China.
This article examines how and why US political players have linked their nation's bilateral trade deficits to China's exchange rate policy and explores the consequences for Chinese policy makers. I argue that by casting the value of the yuan as a major reason for US trade imbalances, US players have made China's exchange rate a reason to asperse China's economic performance and an important factor in Sino-US relations. Many US citizens are influenced by media reports that cast China as the ''big bad wolf'' of globalisation and the major cause of their country's economic woes, including loss of manufacturing jobs, rising debt and increasing economic insecurity. This specious view has gained firm ground even though China's policy-makers' influence on US trade deficits is limited by the global structure of processing trade and by US public and private savings and consumption behaviours. The view also holds an inherent contradiction about responsibility since the USA refuses to export advanced technology goods to China on grounds of national security and therefore can be seen as not maximising its exports to China. 2 Yet, for US political players in the business of attributing blame, the yuan exchange rate is a matter over which the Chinese government has final control and thus it can be treated e ffectively as a major cause of increasing serious US economic insecurity. It serves as an extremely useful deflection from the politically difficult policy action needed to remedy the US economy.
In the dominant US perspective, fault sits firmly on the Chinese side. This view claims that the low value of the yuan, coupled with freedom for China to export into the USA, are responsible for the flood of cheap Chinese goods on which many US economic dilemmas can be blamed. By weakening the US economy and strengthening China's, this export flow has helped to position post-Mao China not just as an economic powerhouse but as a serious challenge to US global dominance economically, politically and potentially even militarily.
In the dominant Chinese perspective, however, exchange rate is not a strategic weapon to undermine any other economy. Although a case can be made for a more flexible exchange rate, the freedom of China's policy makers to vary exchange rate policy to influence US trade deficits is constrained not just by the structural and behavioural factors mentioned above but also by the demands of China's domestic political economy. Here we see how the official views on both sides of the Paci fic begin with attention to domestic need -the Chinese for political and economic stability, the USA for a scapegoat for mounting trade deficits, public and private debt and declining employment opportunities in manufacturing.
US Responses to China's Economic Rise
Debates in US policy-making circles over China's economy and the value of the yuan have precedents in debates during the 1980s over Japan's economy and the value of the yen, when the USA perceived the strengthening of Japan's economy as a threat. Concern in the USA then was the rapid rise of the Japanese economy and perceived invincibility of the ''Japanese model'' of a state-led economy, paralleling the perceived decline in US economic prowess. A concept then popular in East Asia explained Japan's position as Asia's leading goose in the so-called ''flying-geese'' model of catch-up growth, while then Malaysian prime minister, Mahathir Mohamed, openly advocated a ''Look East policy'' for Malaysia. But the bursting of what was subsequently recognised as Japan's bubble economy in the late 1980s ended the adulation and adoption of the Japanese model. With the post-bubble Japanese economy unable to reproduce its pre-bubble impressive growth rates, in the new millennium the concern of US policy makers has shifted to the latest booming economy, away from Japan and the yen to China and the yuan. The break-up of the Soviet Union soon after Japan's ''economic miracle'' ended left the USA as the world's sole superpower. Now, in the middle of the global financial crisis, it is the Chinese economy that remains the only credible driver of economic growth across Asia-Pacific and the major source of funding for US current account deficits.
The shift in attention of US policy makers from Japan and the yen to China and the yuan has been brought about by China's economic rise from late in the twentieth century. China's ''rebirth,'' as Henry Kissinger calls it, ''raises massive global economic challenges that cannot be ignored'' and marks ''a shift in the center of gravity of world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific'' (Kissinger, 2004: 30) . It results from the nation's post-Mao economic reform towards marketisation and re-engagement with the global economy, which propelled China's GDP in purchasing power terms to the world's second largest, only after that of the USA. By 2004 China's GDP was 13.2% of world GDP, compared to 20.9% for the USA. China's share of world GDP was then almost double Japan's share (6.9%) and only marginally smaller than that of the Euro area (15.3%), but it was more than double that of the other rising Asian power, India (5.9%) (IMF, 2005: 193 ).
China's foreign trade, as a conduit of modern technology and management know-how into China, has made a major contribution to China's post-Mao rapid economic growth. It has also contributed significantly to the growth in world trade and Asia's economic growth. From 1979 to 2003 China's foreign trade grew at an average annual rate of 15%, compared with an average annual expansion in world trade of 7% over this period (Prasad and Rumbaugh, 2004: 1) . In 2008, China (8.9%) ranked second in the world after Germany (9.1%) in the share of merchandise exports. With a share of 6.9%, it ranked third after the USA (13.2%) and Germany (7.3%) in world merchandise imports (WTO, 2009: 18) .
Export growth has enabled China to accumulate large current account surpluses and foreign reserves. China's current account surplus reached a peak of 11. 3% of GDP in 2007 (World Bank, 2009a , most of it through trade with the USA, although it fell to 9.6% in 2008, as a result of the global financial crisis. The 2008 US trade deficit with China was about two -and-a-half times the equivalent deficit with Japan, which ranked second, and represented 33.3% of the total US trade deficit of US$800 billion (Table 1 
US Deficits and US Security
For a number of reasons, US authorities view the large deficit in the US balance of trade with The third reason for the USA viewing its trade deficit with China as a security issue concerns the capacity that this financial strength provides China for leverage in the global economy. The (2004: 65) , in a special issue on the future of the US dollar, points out that in 1913
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Britain was at the height of its empire building and the world's largest creditor, but it became a net debtor 40 years later, allowing the dollar to usurp the role of the pound sterling as the world's reserve currency. The transformation in Britain's position from the world's biggest creditor to a net debtor nation is rich in historical lessons. Various interpretations explain the precise relationship between the downward shift in Britain's international investment position and
Britain's loss of empire status, but being the world's biggest debtor over time can only increase the economic vulnerability of the USA and undermine its status as the world's sole superpower.
Nye (2005) argues that China is a long way behind America in exercising ''soft power,''5 but he acknowledges that China is catching up. In Southeast Asia, Kurlantzick (2006) argues that
China's soft power may have already surpassed that of America. No doubt China's growing soft power relative to that of the USA is fuelled by factors beyond its dynamic economy and bloating foreign reserves; the Bush administration's post-9/11 missteps come easily to mind. But the contribution of China's international economic engagements is surely a vital component.
Economic engagements through trade, commerce and so forth provide the channel through which culture, ideas and values flow out from China and in the process also serve to demonstrate China's soft power. The income they generate also increases China's economic power and its financial capacity to further develop military and political power such that China can pose a serious challenge to America's influence in the world. As evidence of China's growing influence, many policy makers and the media have taken on board Zbigniew Brzezinski's suggestion that China and the USA form a group of 2 -a G2 -to tackle the global financial crisis (see Economy and Segal, 2009 ). And Browne (2006) claims that the prospect of China increasing its influence in emerging markets by lending to developing countries unhappy with conditions of IMF loans worries US officials even more than the potential dumping of dollar assets by China as Friedberg speculated.
A final reason for the USA viewing its trade deficit with China as a security issue stems from the point discussed above. Greater economic strength and greater foreign exchange reserves increase China's competitive capacity vis-a`-vis the USA -to acquire energy, to finance significant improvements in science and technology, and to acquire foreign defence and defence-related technology. Heavy dependence on imported oil has put the USA into increasing competition with China and other emerging economies (Victor et al., 2008) . Thompson (2007) explains how China is drawing from its vast foreign exchange supply to compete with the USA for oil in Africa, which has become an important source of US energy. The Gulf of Guinea supplied more oil to the USA in 2005 than Saudi Arabia and Kuwait combined. Thompson (2007: 3) claims that by 2017, Africa will supply more oil to the USA than the entire Middle East. Here Huntington (2005: 261) argued that the USA needs to have ''a clear 'other' against which to define itself.'' He claimed the USA is a glaring exception among developed countries in terms of its high level of religiosity -65% of its population affirmed strong religiosity -making moralism as much the guide to US foreign policy as realism (Huntington, 2005: 80, 88, 91) . He argued that the USA lost a clear ''other'' after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union. China is an ideal candidate to fill this void since it looms large not merely as a strategic competitor but in recent history has avowed atheism; only about 5% of its population affirmed strong religiosity (Huntington, 2005: 91, 267 China's exports more expensive on international markets, but it also lowers the input costs of these exports. Moreover, China has extremely low domestic manufacturing labour costs, about 3% of those in the USA, a quarter of those in Brazil and Mexico and less than 10% of the average cost of Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (Banister, 2005: 32) . Even though China's labour costs have been rising and labour productivity in China remains low, it is unlikely that any conceivable revaluation of the yuan could make US manufacturers competitive in producing the labour-intensive and basic technology manufacturing goods that the USA is importing in large quantities from China. An important reason is that manufacturing wages' growth in China responds to changes in the exchange rate. Mckinnon (2005a Mckinnon ( , 2005b Nolan's (2002) extensive investigation into China's major corporations reported that they have not achieved world class status. A later study (Kiely, 2008: 367) also concludes that the success of China's ''national champions'' has so far been limited. Nevertheless, although China's industrial policy is not an unqualified success, China is still able to climb up the technological ladder and increase its share of value-added in exports. 7 Currently, high domestic value-added exports remain a relatively small proportion of China's exports as research demonstrates, but China is fast catching up. In 1995, the domestic value-added of China's exports to the USA was only 20% (Lau, 2003 
Foreign Trade and China's GDP
Since much of China's foreign trade is triangular, as discussed above, the contribution of China's foreign trade in expenditure terms to its GDP growth since 1998 has been, contrary to popular perception, relatively modest compared to contributions from domestic consumption and investment. China's GDP growth is largely driven by domestic, not foreign, demand (Table 3 ).
The importance of foreign trade for China's GDP growth lies more in the technology and management know-how that foreign firms exporting from China introduced into the country. In the wake of the 1997 Asian economic and financial crisis, in 1999 net demand of the foreign sector actually reduced China's GDP growth. But because the volume of China's exports and imports is so large and growing rapidly at different rates, even though the difference in export and import growth rates is small, the absolute size of the gap between exports and imports is large, exaggerating the actual contribution of foreign demand to growth in China's GDP and employment. Moreover, net foreign trade began to make a significant contribution to China's economic growth only in 2005. Much of net foreign trade's 25% contribution to China's total economic growth in 2005 was due to exports to the USA, which generated 36 million person-years of employment in China (Lau et al., 2006 ). This appears to be a considerable amount, but a simple calculation shows that it represents only 4.75% of the total 758.25 million officially recorded in employment for that year (NBS, 2006: 125) . 
US Savings and Trade Deficits
US savings and spending behaviours are central to understanding the mounting trade deficit. It is, after all, the excess of purchase of imported goods and services by Americans -government and citizens -over sales by USA to China and elsewhere that has created the trade de ficit. Here we see that the large US consumption and investment that helps produce the trade deficit is funded inside the USA not by taxes or private savings but by dis-saving by both government and households.9
Ben Bernanke (2005) , the chair of the Federal Reserve, attributed part of the blame of the large US trade deficits to the large savings of the Asian economies, especially China. But even if China had saved much less, it would have imported more from other countries rather than the USA, because of US controls on exports to China. Moreover, Bernanke neglected to mention two related US government key policy decisions of the previous Republican administration that were responsible for the massive drop in national savings in the USA.
Unlike previous administrations that raised taxes to finance foreign wars, the George W. Bush administration made large tax cuts while conducting its enormously expensive war in Iraq. It raised real federal spending by 4.9% per year -most of it labelled as defence, which registered a real annualised growth rate of 8.1%, compared to 4.9% under Lyndon Johnson whose administration financed the Vietnam War (Rogers, 2006; Tebbs, 2007) . This Bush administration shifted the US government budget from a 1.8% of GDP surplus at the end of the Clinton administration in 2001 to a 4.8% deficit at the end of his first term (Table 4) , with the federal debt ballooning to about US$4.2 trillion at the end of his second term (USG, 2009: 128) .
Not only is the American government dis-saving, Americans citizens are dis-saving too. In the second quarter of 2005, the personal saving rate in the USA became negative for the first time since the Great Depression (Rogers, 2006) . Deficit in the US government budget, together with progressively lower, then negative, US household savings contributed to an excess of expenditure over production in the USA. Imports have to fill the gap when expenditure exceeds production and, since much of the imports are from China, this has exacerbated the trade deficit with China. A change in the nominal dollar-yuan exchange rate may not affect the real exchange rate as mentioned earlier, but even if the real exchange rate were to change it would produce a largely substitution eff ect. What is really required to reduce the level of US spending on total imports rather than simply precipitate a purchasing shift from Chinese to other imports is increased US savings, both private and public. Despite US complaints about the value of the yuan, between 2005 and 2008 the yuan had appreciated about 21.4% against the dollar. The extent of currency appreciation was greater than the 10% yuan undervaluation in 2006, estimated by researchers at the highly respected US National Bureau of Economic Research (Cheung et al., 2009 ), yet the US bilateral deficit with China increased by over 30% in that period (UCB, 2008) . Moreover, yuan revaluation would have little impact on US trade deficits with the major oil-exporting countries, since oil imports are priced in dollars; and the US trade deficits with these countries as a group (OPEC, Canada and Mexico) are larger than its deficits with China (Table 1 ).
China's Domestic Political Economy
China's policy makers working on exchange rate policy have multiple concerns, the most critical of which is social stability. International discussions over the value of the yuan and US views on this issue have caught the attention of the Chinese public and have led to the numerous publications on this subject. Wang and Zeng (2004: 7) argued that China cannot maintain its position as ''factory of the world'' (shijie gongchang) if it relaxes control over the exchange rate. According to Wang and Zeng, revaluing the yuan will weaken China's international competitive position and lower its ability to create much-needed employment. They attribute Japan's recession in the 1990s to the Japanese government's agreement to sign on to the Plaza Accord in 1985 under US pressure, forcing Japan to revalue the yen (Wang and Zeng, 2004: 98 
Conclusion
The discussion above makes clear that responses on both sides of the Pacific to US trade deficits with China are driven by complex motives that concern domestic economic and political demands. Many US observers, including politicians and other officials, treat the value of China's exchange rate as a thorn in Sino-US relations. However, this ''thorn'' cannot be removed easily by the Chinese side alone. Yuan revaluation may reduce US trade deficits with China but even this is by no means certain. Certainly it will not signi ficantly reduce bilateral or overall US deficits unless the US increases domestic savings. Without concomitant increases in US savings from reduced spending, yuan revaluation will simply shift US import demand away from China to other countries. And, while possibly reducing the trade deficit with China, it will surely reduce the welfare of US consumers, who will have to pay higher prices. Increasing the value of the yuan impacts negatively on the rural economy and China's leaders will seriously resist this outcome while they try desperately to improve the rural economy, to reduce poverty and income inequality to counter growing unrest in the countryside. However, a higher yuan will not easily change Americans' perception of China. Accusations by the USA that China's currency is undervalued have been made in a climate where many Americans feel increasingly insecure in their economic relations with China and perceive China as a threat on all fronts to US economic strength and global hegemony. Many US politicians and sections of the media have made China a scapegoat for the challenges that globalisation poses to US producers and workers. They have problematised the value of the yuan to shift blame -and the need for remedial national policy -from some intrinsic but intransigent problems currently burdening the USA as it loses competitive capacity in traditional industries to China and other emerging economies that are quickly mastering the art of competing in global markets. And they will shift their complaint on to some other economic indicator if, as many analysts have predicted, a more rapid appreciation of the yuan resulting from a change in China's policy fails to make a significant dent on US deficits.
Some bankers and government officials in the USA have focused on China's purchase of dollar securities to manage its exchange rate. They claim China encouraged risky investments in the USA by keeping interest rates low through its purchases of dollar securities with foreign exchange largely earned from its exports to the USA. Niall Ferguson (2008) encapsulates their views in attributing responsibility for the global financial crisis to ''Chimerica'' -the symbiotic Sino-US economic relationship -a high-spending US complemented by a high-saving China. But, according to Simon Johnson, a former chief economist of the IMF, the bankers and government oficials are only trying to shift the blame ''in a 'buck stops somewhere else' sort of way'' away from the ''elite business interests'' ''who played the central role in creating the crisis'' to China (Johnson, 2009 ).
China has no influence on corporate governance in the US financial sector. It has also only limited capacity to influence the global changes in the division of labour that continue to push manufacturing production from the rest of East Asia to China and have made China a major centre of manufacturing production for triangular trade. Moreover, China's triangular trade camouflages its low value-added in high value products that it exports and exaggerates its industrial prowess.
And more than 25 years after introducing its well-known one-child family policy, China eff ectively can do nothing more about the size of its vast population, which in flates the nation's absolute economic indicators. The indications that result would appear to be much more modest if they were represented in per capita terms. Meantime the enormous size of China's economy, like its population, guarantees that whatever happens to this economy will have a huge impact on the global economy, including its current leader, the USA.
While China's policy makers do not have to contend with professional politicians to the same degree as their counterparts in the USA, they still have to take into account domestic public opinion that considers US pressure on China's exchange rate policy to be an attempt to impede China's economic development. They are also conscious of the view gaining ground in the USA that China's exchange rate policy, like all of China's trade actions, is part of a deliberate, subversive plan to overtake the USA by any means. The complexity and unprecedented nature of this policy dilemma leave China's policy makers still very unsure about the appropriate exchange rate for the yuan, particularly while China's economy is still undergoing massive structural change. The major challenge for China's policy makers is how to keep their commitment to reduce poverty and income inequality, while externally achieve results that will lower tensions with the USA. This conundrum will continue to challenge Chinese national policy makers, especially while US trade deficits are used [in the blame game] to impose US preferences on China's exchange rate policy.
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3
It is interesting to note that in July 2007 China, with a population of 1.2 billion, and Australia, with a population of 21 million, had foreign exchange reserves per capita of about US$1000 and US$3300, respectively. Australia's foreign exchange reserves data are available from RBA (2007). Nye uses ''soft power'' to refer to the ability to indirectly influence the behaviour or interests of others through cultural or ideological means. Soft power has since entered popular political discourse as a means to distinguish the subtle effects of culture, ideas and values on others' behaviour from more coercive measures such as military action (hard power) or economic incentives.
6
The nominal exchange rate indicates how much of one country's currency can be exchanged for another. The real exchange rate combines the nominal exchange rate with some measurement of domestic cost. It is, therefore, a better indicator of relative competitiveness between two countries than the nominal exchange of their currencies.
7
The improved average know-how embedded in the value-added in production in China is not at the lowest, but is still at among the lower and not the upper rungs of the technological ladder. 8 Lau found in the same study that the domestic value-added of China's exports to the world in 1995 was 30%.
9
Trade deficit þ net international transfers: net private sector dis-savings þ government budget deficit. This is derived from the national income identity: excess of national spending over income : trade deficit.
10
Thanks to one of the anonymous readers for emphasising this point.
11
In another well-known book, researchers at the Faculty of Finance and at the Contemporary Finance Research Centre, Shanghai Finance and Economics University, interpreted the US pressure on China to revalue the yuan as part of US strategy to slow China's rise (SCD, 2004: 12-13) .
